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 “Generations yet unborn will benefit by the ‘Durand Line’ that [Sir Mortimer Durand] 
negotiated with grim Amir Abdur Rahman Khan… Durand stands out in his generation as the 
great Boundary-maker and as a consequence as the great Peace-maker.” –Sir Percy Sykes, The 
Right Honourable Sir Mortimer Durand 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“How can a small Power like Afghanistan, which is like a goat between these lions, or a grain of 
wheat between two strong millstones of the grinding mill, stand in the midway of the stones 
without being ground to dust?” –Abdur Rahman Khan, 1900 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“I have been struck with the magnitude of your resources, your ships, your arsenals, but what I 
cannot understand is why the rulers of so vast and flourishing an empire should have gone across 
the Indus to deprive me of my poor and barren country.” –Dost Muhammad, cited in Afghanistan 
 
 
 
 
 
Between Afghanistan and Pakistan lies an invisible line, 1,600 miles in length, that is 
intended to determine the borders of each country. Though it is largely commonly accepted and 
appears, with mild variations, on nearly all modern-day maps of the world, local Pashtun tribes 
disregard it entirely, passing freely between Afghanistan and Pakistan; their history is fraught 
with nothing but contempt for this line. Indeed, though its existence directly interferes with the 
Pashtun way of life, any tribal input on the matter was deemed irrelevant. That hotly-contested 
boundary, referred to as the Durand Line, was concocted by emissaries of the British Raj during 
the final decade of the nineteenth century in an attempt to establish a buffer state and prevent 
open conflict between two of the pre-eminent imperial powers of the age. This power struggle, 
known as the Great Game, was defined by the British sense of debilitating national insecurity 
surrounding the expanding Russian Empire combined with a desire to increase their territorial 
possessions.  Not only was this line a power play and greedy ruse on behalf of the Raj, but its 
careless demarcation has led to over one hundred years of strife and has fostered countless 
conflicts in the region, which has become a haven for the Taliban, rife with anti-Western 
sentiment. Sadly, however, the line is a mere continuation of the list of British abuses of power 
in Afghanistan. 
Afghanistan is an ethnically complex region, with some fifty-five ethnic groups 
represented.
1
 The largest of these groups are the aforementioned Pashtuns (or ‘Pathans’, in India 
and Pakistan), likely of similar heritage as modern Iranians, who constituted anywhere from two-
fifths to an entire half of the Afghan population. Their existence is somewhat mysterious, though 
many suggest that they are the same ‘Pactyans’ to whom Herodotus refers in The Histories.2 The 
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Pashtun tribes did not see themselves necessarily as subject to the many whims of the Amir; 
rather they existed in a partially self-governing society, dependent upon their own code of 
Pashtunwali. The imposition of British customs upon this tribal society placed them 
uncomfortably at the cultural cross-section of an Afghan society to which they were not ready to 
conform, and British customs which were restrictive, and completely alien in many regards. 
This thesis will provide a cursory background to these events, analyzing the key 
proceedings of the Great Game that led to tensions between Britain and Russia regarding 
Afghanistan and the limited role the Pashtun tribes were permitted to play in the shaping of their 
future nation. It will pay particular attention to the manipulation of the Afghan people on behalf 
of the British Raj in order to enjoy a position of greater security in India, the jewel of its empire. 
As signing the Durand Agreement meant an unconditional surrender to the demands of the 
British in Afghanistan, an examination of both the motivations of the Afghan leader Amir Abdur 
Rahman Khan, who ruled from 1880 to 1901, in placing his signature upon it, as well as an 
analysis of the residual effects felt by the Afghan people, throughout the late nineteenth century 
to present, is crucial. Finally, it will consider the proposed solutions to this long-standing 
conflict. 
Section I: The Early Period 
Rising tensions as the stakes mount in the Great Game 
 
In order to understand the formation of the Durand Line, one must look first to the legacy 
of domineering British involvement in Afghanistan, and then to the tribal nature of the Afghan 
population. Even prior to British involvement in the region, however, Afghanistan’s history was 
marked by a tumultuous nature; the territory that eventually became the modern state was shaped 
through a turbulent process, which eventually placed the borders in the locations in their 
currently acknowledged locations. Throughout history, the land had passed from the hands of 
one dynasty to another, then eventually down into the rule of various warring tribes, until leaders 
emerged who were capable of sufficiently managing the interests of the tribes, yet still able to 
proceed with the modernization of the Afghan state. Amir Dost Muhammad Khan began this 
process in the 1830s, and his son, Sher Ali, continued with it following Dost Muhammad’s 
death.  Despite their best attempts, the territory fell into a period of turmoil defined by constant 
skirmishes with British forces and internal chaos, and the shaping of modern-day Afghanistan 
did not continue until Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, the Iron Amir, assumed control of Afghan 
leadership.   
 The British began a legacy of underhanded policies in Afghan territory under the 
watchful eye of George Eden, First Earl of Auckland and Governor-General of British India. 
Though British interest in Afghan territory originated as early as 1809, no direct conflict arose 
between the two until the First Anglo-Afghan War. This affair is referred to in various 
disparaging contexts; from its common nickname as ‘Auckland’s Folly’, to “part of Britain’s 
ongoing attempts to dismember Afghanistan by various means.”3 While the previous attitude 
toward Afghanistan had been largely passive, Auckland received instructions in June 1836 from 
London, directing him “to watch more closely than [had] hitherto been attempted the progress of 
events in Afghanistan, and to counteract the progress of Russian influence.”4 That missive 
continues to encourage him to use any means necessary to quell the Russian advance, when, after 
nearly three decades of relatively peaceful coexistence, British policy toward Afghanistan shifted 
                                                          
3 Christine Noelle. State and Tribe in Nineteenth-Century Afghanistan: The Reign of Amir Dost Muhammad Khan 
(1826-1863). Padstow, Cornwall: Curzon Press, 1997, p. 40. 
4
 Secret Committee to Auckland, cited in Martin Ewans, Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics, New 
York: Harper-Collins Publishers, 2002, p. 52. 
toward one of preparation for active intervention.  Here, however, is where the narrative fails to 
converge with the behavior of Auckland. His continued insistence that the sworn practice of the 
British government was to avoid “interfering with the affairs of other independent states” 
directly conflicted with the monetary and military support he continued to lend the Sikhs in 
Northern India, in order to move directly against Afghanistan.
5
 
 This marks the first clear instance of British leaders in India directly undermining the 
authority of Afghan leaders, though this practice would become quite commonplace in the years 
to come. What Auckland employed in practice expanded far beyond the intent of the British 
government. Instead of attempting to keep the Russians out of the area, Auckland became 
obsessed with gaining the territory and repurposing it as a buffer state for the British Empire. In 
order to do this, Auckland set about subtly undercutting the influence of the current Amir, Dost 
Muhammad, with the intention of replacing him with the British puppet, Shah Shuja. Shuja had 
previously proven useful to the British in promoting their economic interests in the territory, and 
would no doubt prove an easier ally for Auckland than the strong-willed Dost Muhammad while 
rejecting the economic interests of Tsarist Russia, serving the British twofold.  
Auckland proved here that he was eager to go a step further in his deception, by issuing 
the Simla Manifesto in October 1838. This document cast Dost Muhammad as an unpopular and 
ill-suited ruler, and instead sang the praises of Shah Shuja as a ruler whose popularity “had been 
proved… throughout Afghanistan by the strong and unanimous testimony of the best 
authorities.”6 Both of these statements are egregious, self-serving untruths, as the historical 
record demonstrates that Dost Muhammad served Afghanistan as a visionary ruler, whereas Shah 
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Shuja was nearly universally considered to be inept and unconcerned with how he could best 
serve his people. The fabrications of the Simla Manifesto did not end with falsehoods regarding 
leaders, as the statement concludes with the sentiment that the removal of Dost Muhammad and 
with the “independence and integrity of Afghanistan established, the British army will be 
withdrawn.”7 
 Auckland’s attitude toward Afghanistan proved to be so apprehensive that around this 
time, he developed a sentiment of mistrust toward his own allies in Northern India, Ranjit Singh 
and the Sikhs. Though he clearly felt comfortable manipulating them into marching on Dost 
Muhammad, Auckland regarded Singh, nicknamed the “Lion of the Punjab”, as highly 
mistrustful and was careful to undermine his position. If the Sikhs were able to seize 
Afghanistan, this would constitute a crisis and would prove a serious detriment to British control 
of Northern India. In reaffirming British interests in Afghanistan, Auckland wrote, he would be 
shoring up a buffer state and a “lasting barrier to all encroachments from the Westward, and to 
establish a basis for the extension and maintenance of British influence throughout Central 
Asia.”8 
 As he fostered this greedy desire, concerns surrounding Russia rose sharply. The 
Russians’ slow expansion southward led them to Khiva, for as the British feared Russian designs 
on their territory, the Russians also harbored concern that the British would attempt to 
monopolize commercial interests in central Asia. Strict orders from London decreed that 
relations between the two powers were to remain friendly, but a pervasive atmosphere of unease 
prevailed. Around this time, Sir John McNeill, British Minister to Persia, expressed concern that 
                                                          
7
 Ibid. 
8
 Ibid. 
an alliance between Persians and Afghans would encourage the two to march upon India and 
retake the land they had worked so diligently to “civilize.” 
 The mounting tension between Britain and Russia, combined with the escalation of 
hostilities with Dost Muhammad, eventually culminated in the First Anglo-Afghan War. 
Auckland’s demands that Dost Muhammad deny Persia and Russia contact with Afghanistan and 
return vast tracts of Pashtun-inhabited land to the Empire remained constant. This second tenet, 
much-overlooked, is the first documented instance of British designs on this border territory. 
Despite the fact that they were thoroughly routed and humiliated in their first legitimate clash 
with Afghanistan, the British would eventually acquire the territory they desired for their own in 
1893, upon the signing of the Durand Agreement.  
 Auckland’s legacy as Governor-General would be forever tarnished due to his 
mismanagement of Afghanistan, but his heavy-handed dealings as a representative of the Empire 
lived on far beyond the termination of his tenure in India. Auckland planted the seed that would 
germinate into the ideas held by Durand and his compatriots. The Russians were to be kept out of 
Afghanistan at all costs, by decree or by sheer brute force.  
 Martin Ewans makes a notable distinction in his book, Afghanistan: the solid defeat of 
the British at the hands of their “uncivilized” Afghan neighbors marks the initiation of a spirit of 
endemic hatred between Briton and Afghan. Despite many varied accounts of Afghans from 
early nineteenth century British travelers as respectful, friendly, and tolerant, following their 
stunning defeat in the First Anglo-Afghan War, the attitude shifted toward seeing the Afghans as 
marred with “a reputation for barbarity, treachery, and fanaticism.”9 The British suffered both the 
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economic consequences of defeat and the humiliation of losing the “respect” of their Indian 
subjects, and it became apparent that they would not soon forget the injustice that they felt they 
had undergone at the hands of the Afghans. It seems reasonable to suggest that a desire for 
retribution was a persistent motivating factor for the British in their future dealings with their 
neighbors. 
 They would soon get that retribution, and more, in the Second Anglo-Afghan War, from 
1878 to 1880. Following the prior conflict, Afghanistan descended into a period of political 
turmoil, leaving it susceptible to future attacks on behalf of the British. Suspicion of the Russians 
only weakened in the days following the First Anglo-Afghan War, and Prime Minister 
Gladstone’s replacement, Benjamin Disraeli, favored a hawkish policy involving an incursion 
into Central Asia from the direction of India. Lord Lytton’s appointment as viceroy, however, 
seemed the seminal event in the initiation of the second in this series of protracted conflicts 
between Afghanistan and England. Lytton, known for his arrogance and intolerance, demanded 
that Sher Ali, Dost Muhammad’s successor, receive an emissary in Kabul to counter the Russian 
representative he previously entertained. Sher Ali rejected this proposal, giving rise to the 
Second Anglo-Afghan War.  
 Although the First Anglo-Afghan War certainly established a precedent regarding 
relations between Afghanistan and the Raj during the nineteenth century, it is likely that the 
Second Anglo-Afghan War was the event that broke the will of Afghans and allowed for events 
surrounding the demarcation of the Durand Line to occur. His own letters indicate that Sher Ali 
developed the inherent fear that “if Englishmen, or other Europeans, once set foot in the country, 
it [would] sooner or later pass out of their hands.”10 This was certainly not an unfounded fear, as 
even a cursory examination of British documents regarding Afghanistan make it clearly evident 
that its existence was a continued nuisance, either in hindrance to the furthering of their own 
rapidly expanding empire, or as a jewel of temptation to the worrisome Russians, who were 
certainly a far greater threat than their ‘savage’ Afghan neighbors.  
 Instead, Lytton and Lord Roberts imposed a reign of terror upon any who dared oppose 
their occupation of Afghanistan. As the weak, divided state was further ravaged by baseless 
hangings and random bouts of savage cruelty, Lytton relished the opportunity to usher in such 
vindictive hostility. In a letter addressed to Roberts, Lytton waxes poetic: “Every Afghan 
brought to death I shall regard as one scoundrel less in a nest of scoundrelism… It is our present 
task to shed such a glare upon the last bloodstained page of Indian annals as shall sear the sinister 
date of it deep into the shamed memory of a smitten and subjugated people.”11 In 1879, the Amir 
forcibly signed the Treaty of Gandamak, referred to as the “condemned treaty”, effectively 
ceding any foreign relations to the British.
12
 Afghanistan was humiliated, and with control of its 
foreign affairs handed over to the British government, the once-proud nation was reduced to 
protectorate status in the eyes of the Crown. 
 An analysis of this turn of events is convoluted: as a British protectorate, the sensible 
course of affairs for the British government would be to involve itself with the matter of 
concocting the boundary lines of Afghanistan. However, one must consider to what extent this 
situation allowed for the bloated, self-serving Raj to both promote and protect its own interests. 
                                                          
10
 Oriental and India Office Collections, cited in Martin Ewans, Afghanistan, p. 84. 
11
 British Library, Lytton Pps. 518, cited in Martin Ewans, Afghanistan, pp. 89-90. 
12
 Louis Dupree, Afghanistan. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973, p. 425. 
The protection component of this theory, in particular, provides interesting insight as to British 
motivations for drawing boundaries as they did. 
 Opinions differ regarding the threat Russia posed to India during the Great Game, but 
many of Britain’s policy decisions made during the period were motivated by fear of the steady 
Russian advance southward. From concern rising as early as the latter half of the eighteenth 
century, to Auckland’s early instructions in 1836, all the way to the signing of the Durand 
Agreement in 1893 in order to prevent direct contact between the two empires, trepidation of the 
threat posed by the Russians is pervasive in nearly every move made by the Raj.
13
 According to 
historian J.R. Seeley’s The Expansion of England, common sentiment noted that “any stirrings 
in… Afghanistan, we are obligated to watch with vigilance. The reason is that we have 
possession of India, and a leading interest in the affairs of all those countries which lie upon the 
route to India. This and only this involves us in that permanent rivalry with Russia, which is for 
England of the nineteenth century what the competition with France for the New World was to 
her in the eighteenth century.”14 
 Arguably, the culmination of tensions came in 1865, as the Russians annexed Tashkent 
and founded Russian Turkestan, their colonial venture in Central Asia. They next moved 
southward to defeat Bukhara. Two years later, they set out to take Samarqand, putting them in 
position to seriously challenge the British position in India if they felt the desire to do so. 
Diplomatic representatives working on behalf of the two powers finally agreed in 1872 that 
Afghanistan would be repurposed as a buffer state. This conclusion appears to have been quite 
favorable for the British; in 1800 “the frontier bases of the two empires were 2,000 miles apart; 
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by 1876, that distance had been halved, and by century’s end the gap between the Tsar’s domain 
and British India was only a few hundred miles – indeed as little as twenty miles separated 
outposts in the lofty Pamirs.”15 
 That narrow distance is expressed in the Russian annexation of Merv in 1884, referred to 
in one of the worst historical puns of all time as a bout of ‘mervousness.’16 Upon the Russian 
occupation of the Panjdeh oasis in 1885, directly north of Herat, the Afghans literally found the 
Russians upon their doorstep. Though many contend that hostilities between England and Russia 
reached their apex in 1866, the letters of C. E. Yate, a member of the Baloch-Afghan Boundary 
Commission, refer to summer 1885 as “a time when the question of peace or war between 
England and Russia lay in the balance.”17 
 Whatever conclusion one comes to regarding the continued escalation of aggressions 
between the Russian and British Empires during the Great Game, it must be fundamentally 
understood that these attitudes drove British policy regarding Afghanistan. Largely, the British 
found themselves manipulating their neighbor in order to secure a dominant position against 
their rival. Though they excelled in controlling those in positions of power, it appears that the 
British vastly, and repeatedly, underestimated the resistance they would receive from the Pashtun 
tribes of Afghanistan, particularly those occupying the border areas between India and 
Afghanistan. 
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 On the North-West frontier, a vast population of Pashtun tribesmen lay in wait as these 
events transpired. Under the agreement that was to come, they would no longer be governed 
under their former system of Pashtunwali, but instead would be required to submit to British 
colonial rule in India. Pashtunwali itself is a nuanced and complicated form of tribal governance 
that the British were never fully capable of comprehending. In this case, their policy failures 
were due to their inability to understand the tribal mentality. This is indicated in their varying 
negative attitudes, describing tribesmen as varying from an entertaining curiosity, to simply 
uncongenial, uncouth savages, as did C.E. Yate of the Baloch-Afghan Boundary Commission. 
This proves to be a terrible shortcoming, as the Pashtun are notably referred to as the “largest 
tribal society on earth.”18 Indeed, it would appear that the vast majority of nineteenth century 
British sources describing Pashtun are simply subject to a tendency “to shift along with changes 
of imperial strategy”19, varying from either “noble savages” to “bloodthirsty, treacherous, and 
greedy bandits.”20 
 In any case, three of the most notable tenets of Pashtunwali are honor, hospitality, and 
revenge. These would be tested time and again by continual interference in the lands inhabited 
by the Pashtuns, and sadly equally as frustrating whether perpetrated by the British or by 
Afghanistan’s own Amir, Abdur Rahman Khan. Abdur Rahman’s appointment came amidst a 
push by Disraeli to withdraw from Afghanistan, with “little hope of leaving behind a coherent 
state.”21 Though doubt that Abdur Rahman was the proper candidate for the position was fairly 
prevalent, he shored up his position by obtaining the support of the border Pashtun tribes. This 
marked the beginning of a somewhat anemic relationship between the Afghan government and 
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the very people over whom it was intended to preside. The Afghan leader naturally derived his 
right to rule through the jirga, a necessary tribal consensus. Abdur Rahman immediately 
alienated the tribes with his insistence that he was not, in fact, supported by the decision of the 
jirga, but a divine entitlement to the throne. This claim became exceedingly important after 
Abdur Rahman placed his signature on the Durand Agreement, but immediately served to 
establish an antagonistic nature toward the Pashtun. 
 T.L. Pennell succinctly sums up commonly held sentiment toward the frontier Pashtun 
and their “dualistic” honor code with a translation of one of their proverbs:  
“Tender-handed grasp a nettle, 
It will sting you for your pains; 
Grasp it like a man of mettle, 
Soft as silk it then remains.”22 
 Thus with a cursory understanding of the uncomfortable situation of the Pashtun, both 
politically and geographically, one may examine the Durand Agreement itself and fully 
comprehend its implications. 
 
Section II: Issues Surrounding Demarcation 
Faced with the Pashtun “ethos of independence”, growing concern regarding tribal 
revolts in Waziristan, and the Panjdeh incident between the Russians and the Afghans, common 
sentiment in India held that some form of boundary line would need to be drawn in order to 
prevent both tribal unrest from spilling over into India and to keep the Russians out. Thus, 
commissions were formed in order to oversee this process. The first of these, the 1885 Afghan 
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Boundary Commission, led by A.C. Yate, was sent to demarcate the area between the Hari Rud 
and the Amu Darya. This served the purpose of keeping the Russians out of Afghanistan, 
however, the most pressing concern arose as Russian surveyors were rumored to have ventured 
into the Pamirs, in direct violation of several warnings the British issued regarding their designs 
on Afghanistan. There can be no doubt that “these ‘surveyors’ were unquestionably interested in 
claiming the area for the tsar”, as a small skirmish arose upon their encounter with a pair of 
British officers.
23
 At this juncture, it can be ascertained that had the British not been so stalwart 
with their refusals of the Russians, the possibility that Afghanistan could have instead been 
absorbed into the Russian Empire was certainly not without weight.
24
 Essentially, this conflict of 
Anglo-Russian relations lies ultimately at the center of the Great Game; the British feared 
Russian advance southward, while the Russians coveted choice land in Central Asia. 
 To combat this, various commissions were sent out between 1885 and 1896, in order to 
prescribe Afghanistan’s borders. As aforementioned, the earlier commissions frequently dealt 
with the northern and western region, such as the mountains to the north of Herat. Though these 
boundaries are not the ones in contention today, there is much to be learned from examining the 
writings of the men working on the commissions; consider, for example, the letters of C.E. Yate 
from the 1885 Afghan Boundary Commission. A sense of satisfaction is evidence as Yate and 
company enjoy themselves in the mountains near Herat, while their Russian counterparts are 
plagued, “suffering in the heat of the desert and decimated by sickness [while] we have been 
reveling in a climate where the thermometer rarely exceeded 75 degrees… with hardly a man 
sick in hospital.”25 Nonetheless, Yate’s letters seem to indicate a very suspicious climate, as he 
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frequently comments on the latest rumors passed to him regarding the movements of the 
Cossacks. Certainly, however, Yate paints a colorful picture of Afghans themselves: “the 
Kabulis swagger about armed to the teeth, with knives half as long as themselves and weapons of 
every sort and shape.”26  
 As Abdur Rahman Khan watched the British claim territory west of the Khyber Pass for 
their own, he suggested that a conference be held in order to establish more firmly which 
territory belonged to the Raj and which was to be the possession of Afghanistan. Accounts 
disagree here, but it would appear that Abdur Rahman was not acting on behalf of the border 
tribes, as he was known to hold quite conflicted feelings for the peoples of Waziristan, over 
which he was entirely incapable of holding control. Rather, he meant to keep his own 
possessions in check. 
 To this end, Sir Mortimer Durand, a Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, was 
appointed to negotiate a frontier agreement with the Amir. He arrived in Kabul in winter of 1893, 
appointing three commissions in order to fully demarcate the frontier area in question: the 
Baluch-Afghan Commission, the Asmar Commission, and the Waziristan Commission. These 
groups were tasked with settling the final points of his eponymous agreement, a rousing success 
in all British accounts. His work with the Durand Line is continually referred to as “the greatest 
of all his services in India”, after which he “left India with the highest of reputations.”27 
Conversely, Afghan sentiment regarding the agreement was grim fury; Abdur Rahman Khan’s 
people never entirely forgave him for signing away vital Afghan land, to which they felt entitled. 
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 No two accounts seem to agree on the events leading up to the signing of the Durand 
Agreement, particularly regarding the crucial question of why Abdur Rahman knowingly signed 
his own land away. Durand’s biographer, Sir Percy Sykes, casts the two signatories as invariably 
hard-headed men, who curiously fostered some semblance of mutual respect. The relationship 
between these two larger-than-life characters sheds some light upon the circumstances under 
which the two came to an agreement.  
 Durand himself took an interest in demarcating a boundary between the two areas in 
January 1884, as he expressed in his journal. In particular, he was concerned with the favorable 
position Russia enjoyed, “with nothing to overcome but geographical difficulties - a big nation 
absorbing a number of small weak tribes… We, on the other hand, are a small body of foreigners 
holding two hundred and fifty millions of Asiatics in leash… our [position is] prima facie at 
least, a weak and artificial one.”28 He was insistent on coming to an understanding point-blank, 
however, as Durand’s journals show some extent of tenderness toward the Afghans, or least of 
all a desire to handle matters in the most candid manner possible. With regard to Russia, Durand 
recommended that the Raj “precisely [define] the limits of Afghanistan… and [recognize] the 
extension of Russian influence up to those limits.”29 
 Durand’s stance on Abdur Rahman Khan, however, was initially not as comfortable as it 
eventually became. He saw the Amir as “a troublesome and unsatisfactory ally… thoroughly 
detested throughout the country. His cruelties are horrible… especially as he shows the utmost 
jealousy of ourselves… I should not be sorry to see him driven out of the country.”30 Despite 
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this, the two convened in 1893 to draw up an agreement that acceptably accommodated the needs 
of both Afghans and Britons alike. This document, signed November 12, 1893, is known as the 
Durand Agreement and is one of the single greatest sources of contention regarding the behavior 
of the British Empire in this region.  
 The first proviso of the agreement is immediately problematic, as the line itself is “not 
based on any natural, topographical, ethnographical, or political principle of delimitation”, but 
rather is simply a hastily scribbled mark that pays virtually no attention to the ways in which it 
would affect the inhabitants of the region.
31
 This line is decreed as law – despite the fact that it 
designates large sections of what will eventually be known as Balochistan, the Northwest 
Frontier Province (NWFP), and seven sections of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas as the 
possession of the British Empire. These seven “semi-autonomous agencies” (Bajaur, Khyber, 
Kurram, Mohmand, Orakzai, South Waziristan, and North Waziristan) have a long history of 
occupation of tribes at least nominally under Afghan rule. According to A.S. Ghaus, the 
agreement essentially makes “demands, according to which territories and people who since time 
immemorial had been considered part of the Afghan homeland and nation were arbitrarily 
included in British India.”32 Thus this meant placing restrictions quite abruptly on tribes who had 
passed fluidly from one encampment to another, to establish that one of these sites was in fact in 
another country presented a serious problem. Additionally, it was commonly held that the 
tribesmen were hardly willing to subject themselves to the relatively passive rule of the Amir; to 
conceive of these tribes as having become overnight the subjects of Queen Victoria, Empress of 
India, is absurd.  
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 Despite the storied history of such tribes, Durand scoffed. Their resistance simply 
indicated “they realized that it meant interference with their predatory habits and feared that it 
would ultimately end in annexation.”33 He reassured the Amir that their resistance was due to 
their rage at being subjugated and required to pay taxes, glossing over the lack of regard they 
received in demarcation itself. In practice, however, this caused an even larger problem: this 
agreement established a set of territories within the Northwest Frontier Province that, despite 
being overseen by British sovereignty, existed outside the colonial administration of the Raj. 
 Specifically, debate arose between the two regarding who would receive which 
strategically important territories. The most important geographical feature of the Durand Line 
was that it allowed for the Wakhan corridor, the Afghan border with China, to exist. The 
Wakhan Corridor, virtually indefensible and only ten miles wide at its narrowest, was conceived 
in order to prevent direct contact at any point between territory belonging to the Russians and 
that of the British. The Amir was largely indifferent to receiving this territory, and in practice felt 
that extending his governance to such a remote spit of land would be difficult, though Durand 
remained resolute on the matter. Abdur Rahman, despite an impassioned plea for Waziristan, lost 
the territory he so desperately sought. 
 Once the two agreed upon territories, as noted on the map attached to the agreement, 
Durand asserted the second caveat. Under this tenet, the Government of India abandoned designs 
on Afghanistan altogether with a strict non-interference clause imposed for both parties. This 
was perhaps an optimistic sentiment, as the British quickly violated this in the earliest years of 
the twentieth century. The contentious point of the agreement, however, came in the form of 
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rupees. Her Highness Queen Victoria, Empress of India, assures the Amir of her goodwill, and 
expressed sentiment in favor of the cultivation of Afghanistan as a strong, independent nation. In 
so doing, the British “will raise no objection to the purchase and import by His Highness of 
munitions of war, and… will themselves grant him some help in this respect.”34 Some help in 
this respect in fact referred to the addition of six lakhs of rupees (equivalent to 600,000 rupees) 
per year to the Amir’s bloated salary, essentially no better than bribery. 
 Though the two appear to have sustained a certain amount of trust, Durand nonetheless 
left their meeting with some reservations. He later wrote in his journal that he could not help “a 
sort of feeling of pity for the Amir – standing there fighting his game out against Russia and 
England – absolutely alone. Of course it is largely his own fault that he is alone, but there is 
something rather touching about it.”35 Abdur Rahman Khan, however, appears to be far more 
direct about his feelings, expressing to Durand that: 
“I would fight you if you drove me to it. I am not a coward, and I would fight, though I 
know what the result would be… I would not give up my independence without a fight 
for my honour. But remember what I say. Unless you drive me into enmity, I am your 
friend for my life. And why? The Russians want to attack India. You do not want to 
attack Russian Turkistan. Therefore the Russians want to come through my country and 
you do not. People say I would join with them to attack you. If I did and they won, would 
they leave my country? Never. I should be their slave and I hate them. You would know 
what it is to hate, if you had been an exile among them – humiliated every day.”36 
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 In fact, Abdur Rahman Khan is truly the figure at the crux of the whole Durand Line 
conundrum. One could easily have accused him of playing both sides of the conflict; as a guest 
of the Russians for twelve years in his earlier years, he must have felt some form of obligation to 
maintain relations with them, though certainly not at the expense of the British, who were 
occupying his country. This proved to be a difficult struggle, as the British were highly 
xenophobic and actively resisted any Russian contact with Afghanistan. To this end, the British 
were able to obtain the advantage; Abdur Rahman lacked the financial support he needed, and 
their regular gifts of arms and money were very well-received. This monetary support most 
certainly represented one of his key motivations to sign the Durand Agreement.  
 Many accounts exist detailing his tenure as supreme ruler of Afghanistan. Some say he 
was nearly universally hated, some suggest that he was a strong ruler and a reformer who was 
able to play the hard line against the world’s two largest imperial powers. All agree, however, in 
calling him the Iron Amir, an extremely hard-headed man who was highly insistent in his 
policies. There can be no denying that he alienated many of his people with unpopular measures. 
As aforementioned, his belief in his divine right to rule undermined the authority of the jirga. He 
struggled continually to unite Afghanistan under a common banner, as the Pashtun were highly 
resistant to rule by a figurehead as far away as Kabul. During his tenure, over forty revolts were 
conducted by various border tribes. He relocated many Hazara from their homeland, creating a 
legacy of racism which persists even today in Afghanistan.  
 The Pashtun tribes quickly realized that the Amir was an inept ruler, and having already 
rejected British rule, they found themselves in a unique position with virtually no interference 
from outside authority. This makes them a truly fascinating case study; Afghanistan’s rich tribal 
history gives rise to a degree of tribal pride, to the extent that it supersedes any nationalistic 
tendencies of the tribes. W.K. Fraser-Tytler speaks of Pashtun loyalty in his history of 
Afghanistan, referring to “recurring instances of the tendency of Afghan rulers to look on the 
[Pashtun] nation as one, whole and indivisible, owing, if not temporal, at any rate spiritual 
allegiance to its God-granted ruler in Kabul.”37 No doubt Abdur Rahman Khan was fascinated 
with this idea, and in fact passed off his frequent interferences in the region as an attempt to 
implement this concept. 
He spent a great deal of time and resources, including those that the British provided, in 
an attempt to bring down the feudal tribal system, despite his failure to unify Afghanistan and 
establish his own political authority over most of the territory. British officials in Calcutta 
became concerned that he was in capable of keeping the tribes in check, despite his constant 
incursions in the border territories. Their misgivings led them to the implementation of a forward 
policy, encouraging the use of force against many of the more uncooperative border tribes. Such 
force fomented a strong sense of Anglophobia and hostility amongst the tribes, who saw this 
interference as a violation of their culture and of Pashtunwali. 
 For all his ability to anger the tribes, Abdur Rahman did not fail to antagonize the 
religious elite either. He referred to the mullahs as “ignorant priests whose teachings were 
entirely contrary to the principles and teachings of [Muhammad].”38 He repossessed the waqfs, 
or religious endowments regarding the appropriation of land for charitable endeavors, and 
repurposed them as mere government functionaries and imposed examinations in order to test the 
religious credentials of individuals. 
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 The Amir was also highly suspicious of technological advances; in particular, the 
prospect of the construction of a British railway line “pointing unmistakably toward Kandahar” 
in the game of their ever-expanding “scientific frontier” distressed him.39 This forward progress 
on behalf of the British constituted yet another aspect of their concern toward the Russians; in 
the event of an invasion, in order to shore up defenses quickly in such distant cities as Kabul, 
Ghazni, or Kandahar, they set about “devising…  a means of political control over the tribes in 
whose territories [strategic] passes lay.”40 Abdur Rahman refers to British railway construction 
as “pushing like a knife into my vitals.”41 
 As to the circumstances under which Abdur Rahman Khan signed the Durand 
Agreement, a great deal of disparity exists. Some assert that he signed only “under duress”, 
others conclude that the British bribe of the aforementioned six lakhs of rupees to his stipend 
proved to be the deciding factor, but still another controversial group contests both of these 
opinions.
42
 According to this third school, the Amir could not have possibly understood the full 
implications of his actions, and to agree to sign away access to strategically beneficial coastal 
lands, as well as what had historically been the homeland of his people, seems ludicrous. 
Whatever the actual case may be, several viable options must be considered. 
 The British were clever and studied in their dealings with the Iron Amir. Despite their 
presence in his country as occupiers, they made sure his demands for monetary support were 
met. Certainly, the added lakhs of rupees did not hurt in bolstering the Amir’s support for the 
agreement. According to this theory, convincing the Amir was no easy task. He was originally 
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presented with an inaccurate map of the arrangement that he would not sign. Later, he again 
refused to sign the Persian text of the agreement, despite Durand’s signature on the document.43  
 From this, one has to wonder if the signature on the Durand Agreement is, in fact, Abdur 
Rahman Khan’s. As the Amir would not sign the Persian copy of the agreement, and as he could 
not read English, it would seem rather unlikely that he would choose to sign the English copy 
instead. M. Hasan Kakar makes this argument in A Political and Diplomatic History of 
Afghanistan 1863-1901, contending that as the Amir’s distress over losing a number of major 
territories was so great, it is evident that he could in no uncertain terms be responsible for the 
statement “I renounce my claims…” as it appears in the agreement. In all cases, this perspective 
seems rather implausible, particularly in the fact that the story is not corroborated by Durand’s 
journals. Conveniently for the British, however, all attempts to unearth official Afghan records 
regarding the agreement have been futile. Though a pamphlet was released at the time which 
detailed all arrangements the two men decided upon, it too has been lost.
44
 
 As problematic as the conception of the Durand Line itself was, the physical act of 
demarcating the line proved to be every bit as difficult.  The Baloch-Afghan commission, the 
first to set out, finally returned without having completed their full objective following what 
A.H. McMahon describes as, “15 months of considerable hardship, much hard work, and many 
delays.”45 Completion took over four years, and even by 1897, partial segments had still not been 
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drawn.  The eastern frontier is “unutterably rugged” in sections and plagued by constant bouts of 
weather so bad as to make the area impassable.
46
 
 Despite this, all three commissions were relatively prolific in producing accounts in 
journals and letters regarding their experiences on the frontier. Most of these cast the Pashtun 
tribesmen as entertaining and even fascinating at times, yet give little regard to their needs and 
desires. The Baloch-Afghan Commission’s special correspondent details a group of “simple 
savages” who are enthralled by the arrival of a modern doctor in their camp, “When the people 
found he was a hakim, they crowded round his horse and insisted one and all on having their 
pulses felt! It soon appeared that they regarded him rather in the light of a ‘try-your-strength’ 
machine, and they refused to budge until their strength had been registered. When he gravely 
pronounced them in turn either takra or kahzor they yelled with delight, congratulating the man 
in the first case and jeering at him in the second.”47 Though the accounts do not detail a single 
case in which the commission comes upon a hostile tribe, it is nonetheless apparent that they 
regard the Pashtun as almost child-like. Despite the British attitude that they were doing 
Afghanistan a great service, they were undeniably incapable of understanding the natives, and 
thus could not know what was to be the best course of action for the betterment of the country. 
Ultimately, it can be concluded that the Commissions’ words cannot be taken at face value, 
though they provide a charmingly idealistic vision of the “quaintness” of border-area tribes. 
Despite this, the Raj spared neither opportunity nor occasion to praise these brave men: 
“For the Indian Empire this successful Mission constituted the most important 
achievement of external policy during the nineteenth century. Not only did it stop the 
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further advance of Russia towards India, but it removed a constant source of 
misunderstanding and irritation with that Power.”48 
 
Section Three: Implications and Responses 
 
When considering the legacy of the Durand Line, one must consider the purpose for 
which it was actually intended. Was it meant to serve as a definitive international boundary for 
the ages, or was it simply a frontier agreed upon for the sake of temporarily easing tensions? In 
the Amir’s autobiography, he alludes to the fact that he never “considered any Pashtun areas as 
permanently ceded to the British.”49   The Afghan position is, and has always been, that this 
agreement “never constituted a formal border, but rather an agreed-upon frontier… the formal 
boundary to this frontier has yet to be set.”50 Not once through the years has an Afghan 
administration been willing to make the concession that the Durand Line constituted an 
acceptable agreement on behalf of both parties.  
 Even the British, it would seem, were hesitant to see the line as a long-term international 
boundary. This was simply considered an agreement to “define the respective spheres of 
influence of the British Government and the Amir… simply delineating zones of influence and 
responsibility.”51 This ambiguity proved to be damning upon the Partition of India in 1947, as 
Pakistan was fully prepared to accept the Durand Line as definitive law. 
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 The effects of the line were felt almost immediately. Though it was intended to be a 
quick fix for discord in the tribal areas, unrest was immediately amplified. Tribes who rebuffed 
the rule of the Amir were certainly not fit to be governed by British India, who failed even more 
spectacularly than the Amir in gaining control of the area. Under Pashtunwali, badal (revenge) 
attacks flourished as resentment mounted.
52
 Only two decades later did Abdur Rahman Khan’s 
successor, Amanullah, force the British into making their first concession on the matter of the 
tribal areas, convincing them to attach a letter to the Treaty of 1921. This letter was the first 
admission that Afghanistan did, in fact, have an ‘interest’ in the frontier tribes currently under 
the rule of British India.
53
 The British had their revenge on Amanullah, however. In 1929, his 
regime collapsed under tribal insurrections most likely fomented by British trepidations over his 
virulent reforms.
54
 
The Partition of India into two separate states, India and Pakistan, in 1947, brought the 
inconsistencies of the Durand Agreement to the forefront, and foreshadowed the chaos to come. 
Discussion of the partition resurrected Afghan concerns surrounding the line; Pashtuns should 
not be required to choose between being Indian or Pakistani, but ought to be allowed to have the 
option of forming their own Pashtun state. This unrest was quickly trampled by Sir Olaf Caroe, 
Governor of the Northwest Frontier Province, and hostilities intensified. Afghanistan summarily 
held a loya jirga in July 1949 to revoke all treaties with the British, the most significant of these 
being the Durand Agreement. This was, they explained, due to the fact that “when the British left 
South Asia [they] were not transferable to the new state of Pakistan.”55 This contributed to the 
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initiation of mutual resentment between Afghanistan and Pakistan, “[exacerbating] Pakistan’s 
acute sense of insecurity at birth.”56 
Pakistan’s entire existence has been defined through the fear of its statehood 
disintegrating. Since its inception, it has been plagued by constant, bloody revolts, and such 
traumatic events as the gruesome civil war of 1971 in which Bangladesh seceded. Afghanistan, 
by contrast, is a “strong nation but a weak state, while Pakistan is a strong state with no strong 
sense of nationhood.”57 This tension is only made stronger through Pakistan’s insistence that the 
Durand Line does in fact constitute their international boundary with Afghanistan, whereas since 
Pakistan’s inception, over sixty years of successive Afghan governments have rejected the 
agreement staunchly. 
Thus, the two countries proceeded forward with sense of resentment from the start. 
Pakistan, much like the British before them, prolonged the British policy regarding the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas. Though they are described as Pakistani, the tribes operate 
autonomously, with no intervention from Pakistani law. This policy has fostered a culture of 
lawlessness in the region, as the tribes have descended into a vague semblance of self-
governance. As it would be virtually impossible to police, the passage from one side of the line 
to the other is not restricted in any context whatsoever. Thus the corridor became a major route 
for smuggling and illegal activities, in light of the lenient border regulations by which it is 
monitored. 
During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the line provided an unguarded border for 
sympathizers and freedom fighters eager to assist the Afghans in their jihad to move freely 
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across.
58
 Indeed, Zia ul-Haq, the military ruler in Pakistan at the time of the invasion, encouraged 
Afghanistan’s jihad by funding medrassas and providing weapons to the resistance. In so doing, 
he created a radical, militaristic sect on the border region.
59
  
In this climate, FATA was repurposed as “both a haven for Al Qaeda leaders and a base 
for Afghan Taliban to conduct cross-border attacks on the Government of Afghanistan and the 
international forces assisting it.”60 This further serves to agitate antipathy between the two states, 
as neither is willing to accept responsibility for this border force. 
By deterring Pashtun tribal pride, and conversely supporting Islamist militias such as the 
Taliban, Pakistan’s government stands to protect their own interests. Since Afghans have been 
calling for the independence of a Pashtun state since the Partition, if Pashtun nationalism grows, 
the Pashtun stand a decent chance at gaining their own state. This would mean the loss of open 
territory for Pakistan, as well as the potential surrender of significant cities such as Peshawar. 
Such a move would deliver a devastating political blow to an already-volatile climate in the 
region. Thus, funding the Taliban presents itself as a relatively attractive defensive strategy for 
the Pakistani government. Currently, much dispute surrounds Pakistan’s support of the Taliban; 
in October 2007, the International Crisis Group reported that “the Taliban and its Pakistani allies 
are undermining the state-building effort in Afghanistan.”61 Despite this, the regime of Pervez 
Musharraf, then-Pakistani president, repeatedly denied these allegations.
62
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In the days following the September 11
th
 attacks, under significant international pressure, 
Pakistan declared itself an ally of the United States in its War on Terror. However, doing so 
created a somewhat ironic and uncomfortable situation in which Pakistan aided a search-and-
destroy mission against the very organization it originally backed. Consequences of international 
ultimatums on Pakistan are deep in their complexity; reports exist of Pakistani soldiers openly 
surrendering to Islamic militants, showing a pervasive indifference in the Pakistani military and 
impeding international efforts in-country to no end.  In addition to this, the Pakistani government 
has great economic incentive for the situation to remain in its current, ambiguous state. Pakistan 
directly benefits from the high volume of illegal trade into Afghanistan, in arms as well as 
controlled substances. 
In this environment, the situation continues to fester, as “Afghanistan blames Pakistan for 
fueling the insurgency in Afghanistan in order to destabilize the government of Hamid Karzai 
and install a more compliant government in Kabul.”63 At the same time, however, in its currently 
crippled state, Afghanistan is economically dependent on Pakistan to fully function. After 
Pakistan gained independence in 1947, Afghanistan was the only country to vote against their 
membership in the United Nations.
64
  
The outlook on reforming the mistakes perpetrated in the Durand Agreement may be 
rather grim, as the most viable solutions simply address the issues and not the root of the 
problem. In order to come to a feasible solution, it must be clearly defined and agreed upon 
whether the Durand Line represents an international boundary, or simply a frontier. Both 
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countries must agree upon a cessation of hostilities, and steps were taken in 2007 in the form of a 
‘peace jirga’ between Afghanistan and Pakistan.  
To this end, the American Institute of Afghanistan Studies and the Hollings Center held a 
conference devoted solely to analysis of the Durand Line. The major result of this conference 
was a five-step framework in order to move toward a peaceable solution to the debate. The first 
tenet of this involves the acknowledgement on behalf of Afghans that, however suspect the 
conditions under which it was established, this line has in fact served as an international 
boundary for longer than a century. It also considers the transfer of territory, acknowledging that 
it would most likely be quite a small portion nonetheless.  
The document continues on to discuss the importance of maintaining a soft border, 
allowing for tribesmen to pass freely through the fluid border as they currently do. In order for 
this to be practicable, however, it would be necessary for both governments to gain greater 
control over their respective sides of the border. In addition, international parties must assist in 
implementing confidence-building measures, such as trade and security, in order to strengthen 
the border. The conference points out the need for the involvement of the United States, or 
another major third-party arbiter, in order to “take the initiative in bringing the parties together 
and provide the political incentives needed to help maintain progress once they have started the 
process.”65 The final conclusion of the council indicates that in addition to the above measures, a 
substantial aid package may be necessary in order to encourage both parties to come to a positive 
finality. 
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However optimistic such discussions may appear, it must be accepted that this conflict’s 
long, protracted history will not be easily overcome. In any case, unabashed European greed 
caused an elongated feud, with implications far beyond the imaginations of those who hastily 
drew a line on a map in 1893. Particularly in light of such high-profile events as the assassination 
of Osama bin Laden, international gaze has been fixed squarely upon the debacle instigated by 
the Durand Line. It is clear that the opportunistic British officials were merely serving their own 
ends with these unscrupulous policies, though the resounding effects are felt over a century later. 
In any case, the fault here can be clearly traced back to this lack of regard, though it was a 
convoluted set of circumstances that allowed for such a reprehensible decision to be made. The 
conflict remains a storied one and as of yet fails to yield a compromise that would satisfy both 
parties. Afghanistan’s rich tribal history confirms that they will not abandon pursuits to regain 
lost territory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Durand Line Agreement 
(November 12, 1893) 
Agreement between Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, G. C. S. I., and Sir Henry Mortimer 
Durand, K. C. I. E., C. S. I. 
Whereas certain questions have arisen regarding the frontier of Afghanistan on the side of India, 
and whereas both His Highness the Amir and the Government of India are desirous of settling 
these questions by friendly understanding, and of fixing the limit of their respective spheres of 
influence, so that for the future there may be no difference of opinion on the subject between the 
allied Governments, it is hereby agreed as follows: 
1. The eastern and southern frontier of his Highness's dominions, from Wakhan to the 
Persian border, shall follow the line shown in the map attached to this agreement. 
  
2. The Government of India will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying 
beyond this line on the side of Afghanistan, and His Highness the Amir will at no time 
exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of India. 
  
3. The British Government thus agrees to His Highness the Amir retaining Asmar and the 
valley above it, as far as Chanak. His Highness agrees, on the other hand, that he will at 
no time exercise interference in Swat, Bajaur, or Chitral, including the Arnawai or 
Bashgal valley. The British Government also agrees to leave to His Highness the Birmal 
tract as shown in the detailed map already given to his Highness, who relinquishes his 
claim to the rest of the Waziri country and Dawar. His Highness also relinquishes his 
claim to Chageh. 
  
4. The frontier line will hereafter be laid down in detail and demarcated, wherever this may 
be practicable and desirable, by joint British and Afghan commissioners, whose object 
will be to arrive by mutual understanding at a boundary which shall adhere with the 
greatest possible exactness to the line shown in the map attached to this agreement, 
having due regard to the existing local rights of villages adjoining the frontier. 
  
5. With reference to the question of Chaman, the Amir withdraws his objection to the new 
British cantonment and concedes to the British Government the rights purchased by him 
in the Sirkai Tilerai water. At this part of the frontier the line will be drawn as follows: 
 
From the crest of the Khwaja Amran range near the Psha Kotal, which remains in British 
territory, the line will run in such a direction as to leave Murgha Chaman and the Sharobo 
spring to Afghanistan, and to pass half-way between the New Chaman Fort and the 
Afghan outpost known locally as Lashkar Dand. The line will then pass half-way 
between the railway station and the hill known as the Mian Baldak, and, turning south-
wards, will rejoin the Khwaja Amran range, leaving the Gwasha Post in British territory, 
and the road to Shorawak to the west and south of Gwasha in Afghanistan. The British 
Government will not exercise any interference within half a mile of the road. 
6. The above articles of' agreement are regarded by the Government of India and His 
Highness the Amir of Afghanistan as a full and satisfactory settlement of all the principal 
differences of opinion which have arisen between them in regard to the frontier; and both 
the Government of India and His Highness the Amir undertake that any differences of 
detail, such as those which will have to be considered hereafter by the officers appointed 
to demarcate the boundary line, shall be settled in a friendly spirit, so as to remove for the 
future as far as possible all causes of doubt and misunderstanding between the two 
Governments. 
  
7. Being fully satisfied of His Highness's goodwill to the British Government, and wishing 
to see Afghanistan independent and strong, the Government of India will raise no 
objection to the purchase and import by His Highness of munitions of war, and they will 
themselves grant him some help in this respect. Further, in order to mark their sense of 
the friendly spirit in which His Highness the Amir has entered into these negotiations, the 
Government of India undertake to increase by the sum of six lakhs of rupees a year the 
subsidy of twelve lakhs now granted to His Highness. 
H. M. Durand, 
Amir Abdur Rahman Khan. 
 
Kabul, November 12, 1893. 
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